Next group of High School Football Champions right there. Congratulations boys and coaches on a great year. Remember to work hard and continue to do your best.

Woo-Hoo boys - thanks for the great games this year!!! :)

Congratulations boys, did Fallbrook proud!

This was a great season and a great team. These boys worked hard and it paid off. Like any other team, we had ups and downs; but we had a lot of fun both on the field and off. The Mitey Mites learned to win and lose with pride and class even in the face of teams that may have been lacking the some of these principles. New friendships were made amongst the boys, coaches and parents. Everyone just bonded together great. Looking forward to Rugby with some these great kids and then again at Jr Pee-Wee level next year. 2012 Season, 7-3....well done Mitey Mites!

We had a group of boys like that years ago. Coached by Al Padilla 1 st team in North County to go to Superbowl in Florida. Later won Fallbrook High CIF champs.Hopefully Pop warner is making a well deserved comeback :)

#21 last name was spelled wrong..

PRESS RELEASE
The DAB Safety Team: November 21, 2012

Media Contact: Don Leichtling (619) 296-9928 or Ace Hoffman (760) 720-7261

The DAB Safety Team Agrees With Newly Released MHI Data:

Plug All Of SONGS Unsafe Tubes, Not Just Some


The DAB Safety Team along with the support of an ever-growing number of SONGS Concerned Insiders and Whistleblowers, prepared the following analysis, which is consistent with the conclusions presented in the publicly available reports provided earlier on this subject by:

1. Fairewinds Associates Internationally Known Nuclear Consultant Arnie Gundersen and his team of Anonymous Industry insiders, who have had lengthy careers in the design, fabrication, and operation of nuclear steam generators.
2. Professor Daniel Hirsch and Internationally Known Nuclear Consultant Dale Bridenbaugh.
3. Publicly available posted documentation by Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, a retired engineer from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) report issued in February 2001, which substantiated many of Dr. Hopenfeld's concerns,
4. David A. Lochbaum, Director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).

MHI Part 21 (10/05/2012) - Steam Generator Tube Wear Adjacent To Retainer Bars: The following information was received via email: "Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD (MHI) has identified steam generator tube wear for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. "The Steam Generator tube wear adjacent to the retainer bars was identified as creating a potential safety hazard. The maximum wear depth is 90% of the tube thickness. The cause of the tube wear has been determined to be the retainer bars' random flow-induced vibration caused by the secondary fluid exiting the tube bundle. Since the retainer bar has a low natural frequency, the bar vibrates with large amplitudes. This type tube wear could have an adverse effect on the structural integrity of the tubes, which are part of the pressure boundary. The plugging of the tubes that are adjacent to the retainer bars was performed. MHI has recommended to the purchaser to remove the retainer bars that would have the possibility of vibration with large amplitude or to perform the plugging and stabilizing for the associated tubes."

SCE Unit 2 Restart Plan, Attachment 4, Page 9, Line 13, MHI States, "In order to ensure the structural integrity of the tubes after restarting the plant, all tubes which have a potential for losing their integrity during the next operating period should be plugged and thermal power output of the plant should be decreased. Plugging for the Type 1 wear should include not only the tubes with the Type 1 (tube-to-tube) wear but also tubes which are susceptible to the Type 1 wear, for preventative reasons." Attachment 4, Page 82, Section 8.1.3, MHI states, “ Tubes with wear indications adjacent to the retainer bars should be plugged regardless of the wear depth. Furthermore, all tubes that have a possibility to come in contact with the retainer bars should be preventatively plugged.” SONGS Technical Specification states, “Structural integrity performance criterion: All in-service steam generator tubes shall retain structural integrity over the full range of normal operating conditions (including startup, operation in the power range, hot standby, and cool down and all anticipated transients included in the design specification) and design basis accidents.” General design criteria (GDC) 14, “Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB)” of Appendix A to United States Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” states “The RCPB shall have “an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage…and gross rupture.”

Even at 70% power operations, if a steam line break outside containment were to occur in Unit 2, the depressurization of the steam generators with the failure of a main steam isolation valve to close would result in 100% void fraction in the entire U-Tube bundle. This condition of ZERO Water in the steam generators would cause fluid elastic instability (FEI) and flow-induced random vibrations. This adverse condition, in turn would result in hundreds of SG tube failures/ruptures due to tubes hitting each other because of extremely low tube clearances, NO in-plane support protection, and movement of retainer bars with large amplitudes due to low natural frequencies. With an undetermined amount of tube leaks/ruptures, approximately 60 tons of very hot high-pressure radioactive reactor coolant would leak into the secondary system. The release of this amount of radioactive primary coolant, along with an additional approximately 200 tons of steam in the first five minutes from a broken steam line would EXCEED the SONGS NRC approved safety margins and result in a nuclear meltdown like Fukushima in Southern California.
Many steam generator tube ruptures and steam line break events have occurred in the last 30 years at nuclear power plants throughout the world (See DAB Safety Team’s SONGS MSLB Analysis). In light of the Unit 3 Replacement Steam Generators (RSGs) unprecedented eight tube failures due to 99.6% steam voiding, narrow tube pitch to tube diameter ratio, low tube clearances and NO Designed "In-plane Fluid Elastic Instability support protection" and other tube ruptures/steam line break events, the DAB Safety Team agrees with MHI that all the Unit 2 Tubes would be susceptible to the Type 1 (tube-to-tube) failures/ruptures due to 100% steam voiding of the entire U-Tube Bundle in case of a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). Therefore, to meet the SONGS Technical Specifications and GDC 14 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 for a MSLB and prevent a nuclear accident and reactor meltdown in California from cascading tube ruptures, all Unit 2 RSG’s Tubes should be preventatively plugged before Unit 2 Restarts. In other words, the Unit 2 RSG’s in the “As Designed and Degraded Configuration” cannot be OPERATED at any “Power Levels” due to the substantial risk of nuclear meltdown described above.

Copyright November 21, 2012 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and or the DAB Safety Team’s Attorneys.

The Defective Radiation Steaming Nukes at San Onofre are mirror images
of each another. One is shutdown due to a Near-Miss Radiological
Accident and to give permission by NRC to startup the other damaged
one for SCE to make profits is suicidal for the Great People of
Southern California. SCE is now in Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A,
GDC 14, 15, 30 and 32 and SONGS Technical Specification Requirements
and cannot be allowed to Restart Unit 2 Radiation Steaming Crucibles.
SONGS Chief Nuclear Officer Pete Dietrich said on January 10, 2012.
“The plant’s largest components, steam generators, are just two years
old and represent the safest, most efficient 21st century machinery.”
[Source: Market Watch]. All the 4 CHEAP & DEFECTIVE Radiation Steaming
Crucibles are of the same SCE “Innovative and Challenging Design”
fabricated by the Inexperienced Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, who does
not possess the knowhow of Westinghouse to build a Combustion
Engineering Replacement Steam Generator.

Many steam generator tube ruptures and steam line break events have
occurred in the last 30 years at nuclear power plants throughout the
world. In light of the Unit 3 Replacement Steam Generators (RSGs)
unprecedented eight tube failures, which happened due to high steam
flows, high steam velocities, insufficient contact forces between the
Tubes and AVBs, 99.6% localized steam voiding [Result of low steam
pressures, narrow tube pitch to tube diameter ratio, low tube
clearances, NO design "In-plane Fluid Elastic Instability support
protection", taller Tube Bundle, Mitsubishi Flowering effect] and low
frequency retainer bars vibrating with large amplitudes due to random
vibrations. Help All Hurt Never Baba agrees with MHI that all the Unit
2 Tubes would be susceptible to the Type 1 (tube-to-tube wear) and
Type 4 (Retainer Bar wear) failures/ruptures due to 100% steam voiding
of the entire U-Tube Bundle in case of a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)
/MSIV Failure to close or Steam generator over-pressurization followed
by lifting of relief Valves. Therefore, to meet the SONGS Technical
Specifications and GDC 14 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 for a MSLB /
Unanticipated Operational transients and prevent a nuclear accident
and reactor meltdown from cascading tube ruptures in Southern
California, all the tubes susceptible to Type 1 and Type 4 wear should
be preventatively plugged before Unit 2 Restart. In other words, the
Unit 2 RSGs in the “As Designed and Degraded Configuration” cannot be
OPERATED at any “Power Levels” due to the “Tube Plugging Limit” and
substantial risk of nuclear meltdown. So now the Trillion Dollar
Question is would the NRC give Pete Dietrich a Christmas Present in
the November 30 Public Meeting and let SCE operate Unit 2 to
experiment if 16 Unit 2 tubes can break at MSLB conditions, meltdown
the Unit 2 reactor and create Fukushima and Chernobyl in Southern
California’s Back Yards? Pete Dietrich better tell Ted Craver and Ron
Litzinger to be ready with a $12 Billion Nuclear Liability Insurance
Premium for a Trillion Dollar Coverage for a Potential Nuclear
Accident in the Making!

Public perception is very strong that NRC is not following the Doctrine and Charter of His Excellency President Obama, United States Congress and Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works to protect the public from potential nuclear accidents. Advice to NRC: Please read the SCE Restart Documents and Operational assessments very thoroughly and critically and do not let SCE sweet talk you into believing that it is safe to Run Unit 2, just like they did with 10 CFR 50.59 for Replacement Steam Generator. This is Democratic America and not a Third world Country, where you can get away with not following regulations or Japan, where TEPCO and Japanese Regulators have ignored safety warnings for years and so many nuclear accidents have happened including Fukushima. If some accident happens in Unit 2, the consequences are very clear. Fukushima, Mihama, Chernobyl, Three Mile Island….

Tthe following analysis is consistent with the conclusions presented in the publicly available reports provided earlier on this subject by:

1. Fairewinds Associates Internationally Known Nuclear Consultant Arnie Gundersen and his team of Anonymous Industry insiders, who have had lengthy careers in the design, fabrication, and operation of nuclear steam generators.
2. Professor Daniel Hirsch and Internationally Known Nuclear Consultant Dale Bridenbaugh.
3. Publicly available posted documentation by Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, a retired engineer from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) report issued in February 2001, which substantiated many of Dr. Hopenfeld's concerns,
4. David A. Lochbaum, Director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).

Thanks, just trying to be of help to the Public, NRC and Nuclear Industry…